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SOCIAL DISTORTION
AN APPROACH TO RACE RELATIONS
HE sheer incomprehensibility of sociologists
is said to be a problem for both their scientific
colleagues and the lay public. It all depends, as 
the late Professor Joad used to say, on what you mean 
by incomprehensibility. From the standpoint that the 
words they use are not being understood, the socio­
logists seem to fare no worse than many other 
scientists. In a recent comparison between six scien­
tific disciplines it at first appeared that the psycho­
analysts were best understood, with sociology fifth on 
the list and experimental psychology at the end.1 
When an analysis of variance was done, however, 
there were no significant differences in word compre­
hension between any of these disciplines.
The form of incomprehensibility which we are to 
consider tonight is of a different order: it does not 
rest only on a failure in the use of words. The general 
idea o f  s o c ia l  d is to r t io n  has been sociologically analysed 
under various headings from Pareto and Weber to 
Merton and Riesman. As far as I know, however, the 
whole theme has not been drawn together and applied 
in the field of race relations. And yet it pervades 
almost everything in society at large that we say and 
do. Certainly the sociologists are not alone in being 
incomprehensible in terms of their distortions of 
social reality.
Now before I plunge into this somewhat philoso­
phical material, I should like briefly to acknowledge 1
1Cheek, F. E. and Rosenhaupt, M. 1968 Are Sociologists 
Incomprehensible? An Objective Study. Am er. ] .  Sociol. 73, 5, 
617-627.
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my debt to the past and give reasons for choosing so 
hazardous a topic as race relations in which to apply 
my analysis. In the first instance I want to pay tribute 
to my colleague and predecessor, Clyde Mitchell. In 
his inaugural lecture he pointed out that he was a 
social anthropologist and Professor of African Stud­
ies ; but of course he is also known as a very competent 
sociologist. Now that the chair has become one of 
Sociology, I hope that the new title will be as broadly 
interpreted as the old. Not only is the department in 
practice a joint department of sociology and social 
anthropology, but in any case the term Sociology 
suitably links the disciplines in which I work. Among 
these I particularly include psychology, whose impor­
tance for sociology, in spite of the strictures of 
Durkheim2 and others, I shall be stressing here.
From this it is not difficult to move into a justifica­
tion for the topic of race relations. Firstly, this is p a r  
e x c e lle n c e  a mixed field in which a multi-disciplin­
arian like myself could reasonably be expected to take 
an interest. Secondly, it is also a subject which has not 
developed a theoretical structure of its own; and an 
important part of my message is that sociological 
understanding has a special part to play in this regard. 
Thirdly, Central Africa is of course a focus of concern 
for race relations; and our department has been 
fortunate in securing research funds from the Round 
Table Chair of Race Relations attached to the College. 
In the circumstances, a sociological approach to race 
relations is surely the appropriate subject for this 
inaugural lecture.
2 e.g. “ (taking) . . . the viewpoint of those sociologists who, 
making sociology a science completely irreducible to psycho­
logy, consider it as necessary and sufficient for the total explan­
ation of social reality.” Durkheim, E. in Larousse d u  XXe Siecle. 
Paris, 1933.
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It seems only fair to say that for such a topic about 
half the time will have to be spent on the sociological 
approach itself. In the first place, I wish to put for­
ward a particular philosophical position which is 
based on the sociology of knowledge. Again, the 
model of society which will be proposed is on 
a psychological basis, and is therefore unfamiliar 
enough in sociology to need a careful exposition. 
Finally, the methods of sociology, like those of any 
other science, need stating as a prelude to each investi­
gation.
For purposes of this lecture, then, the material 
will be organised at three levels which in my view are 
those of modern sociological method. In succeeding 
order of penetration, these are social facts, social 
constructions and models, and social insight. At each 
level I shall try to assemble the material in such a way 
as to illuminate race relations, and in the end we shall 
approach this whole subject with the techniques 
which emerge from the analysis.
At the first level of social facts, there is some dis­
pute about whether the collection of social facts alone, 
at a purely descriptive level and without interpreta­
tion, is part of sociology at all. In social anthropology, 
descriptive fact-gathering or sociography is sometimes 
looked upon with a certain amount of contempt but 
seems scientifically legitimate. In sociology, to take 
perhaps an extreme view, we find Peter Berger con­
tending that there is almost no sociology at all in the 
famous Kinsey reports.:i It might have been thought 
that the scientifically itemized sexual behaviour of 
the American male and female would have been of 
some sociological significance; but simple counting, 3
3Berger, P. L. 1963 Invitation to Sociology: A  Hnmcmi5t!L 
Perspective. Penguin Books, reprint, p. 22.
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or even correlating items that one counts, is not 
according to Berger sociology.
Such a view seems to rest on a much oversimplified 
conception of what social reality amounts to: in fact, 
on a set of hypotheses which might be called the 
Absorption or Exposure theory of reality. On this 
theory fact-collecting is pre-scientiiic merely because 
it is so simple. Social reality is believed to be object­
ively “out there”, and one has only to be exposed to a 
social situation to absorb it “as it really is”. For this 
purpose any competent and trained observer can 
report back “exactly what has happened” ; and then 
the real work of sociological interpretation begins.
From the experience of our legal colleagues alone, 
the difficulty of finding even the facts of an accident 
from a group of “eye-witnesses” should have cast 
doubt on this theory; but it still remains an obdurate 
adaptation from the inanimate world of physical 
science. The problem is that social facts are not 
“hard” but “soft” facts: that is to say, they are 
coloured, distorted, even created through processes 
within the observer, both psychological and cultural. 
These lead to what can be called f a c t  d is to r t io n  of 
whatever social reality may be.
The first of these processes in fact distortion is 
that of “word-blocking”, or for that matter “number­
blocking”. In western culture we have heavily over- 
learned to manage our environment and defend our­
selves with words and numbers. These constant de­
vices seem to have had at least four unfortunate 
results for social science. Firstly, the words or num­
bers block out an experience while it is actually hap­
pening to us. From sheer habit we have difficulty in 
directly experiencing without at the same time des­
cribing what is happening, to ourselves or to others. 
Secondly, when words or numbers are used to de­
scribe the experience afterwards, they reduce or thin 
it down. This is because our culture-laden vocabulary
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only selects the parts of experience which seem useful 
to manage the environment or are culturally interest­
ing. Even then we are verbally floundering after what 
has happened in a world of ever-changing meanings; 
or, as T. S. Eliot has so beautifully put it:
"Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt 
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind o f failure 
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words 
For the thing one no longer has to say . . .”4
Thirdly, and closely connected, the words are too 
inaccurate to describe even that which we do perceive 
and retain. The reason here is that most of our words 
are overworked and blurred from use in too many 
contexts. Finally and worst of all, we can easily manip­
ulate words and numbers so as to make the experience 
appear what we think it should have been, or would 
have liked it to have been. All this is bad enough in 
one’s own cultural milieu; it can be highly distorting 
in another culture when one does not know the sig­
nificance of what is being omitted.
Second in the process of fact distortion is what 
may be called “filtering”, a phenomenon which 
applies especially to the observation of human rela­
tions. To use a computer-like model of the human 
personality for a moment, we all go through life 
equipped with a defensive filter which is served by a 
memory bank. Through the filter are transmitted and 
received all communications with others, even in 
cases when we think that we are passive spectators. 
The memory bank supplies the filter with all the 
preconceptions, attitudes and role expectations which 
we have acquired and internalized over a lifetime. 
Fairly obviously, when two people interact, the 
shared communication has to go through their two
4Eliot, T. S. 19n2 East Coker. Four Quartets, 9th impress. 
London, Faber & Faber, p. 21.
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filters, which means that fact distortion is usually 
magnified. Should I meet a man with a different 
ethnic appearance from myself, then this stimulus 
might touch off certain associations from my memory 
bank. If the accompanying emotional tone is an un- 
pleasant one, then I may behave unpleasantly quite 
irrespective of how he behaves and may read his 
friendly gestures as offensive. This rebuff will rein- 
force any unpleasant traces in his memory bank con­
nected with m y ethnic appearance; and this in turn 
will probably ensure his deteriorated behaviour in a 
similar encounter in the future. It is thus all too easy 
for information through any filter to follow stereo­
typed patterns and run irretrievably along rails which 
have been laid by the individual’s experience and 
psychological make-up. The process of communica­
tion is difficult enough when the interactors have the 
same culture in common; it can be much more dis­
torted in a race relations situation.
Third in the sequence of fact distortion is cultural 
distortion, which may be seen in two aspects: cultural 
selectivity and the dominant cultural climate of the 
time in which one operates. It would appear that all 
cultures select what seems to be useful or interesting 
from the vast variety of phenomena available in a 
given environment, and that the selections made are 
in terms of certain values. Speaking very generally, 
one might say that western-type cultures in this 
regard are purposive and competitive, or to use 
McClelland’s term, need-achievement oriented.5 
Some non-western cultures, on the other hand, seem 
to make contemplative and permissive value choices, 
while still others appear paranoid in western value 
terms. Such contrasts imply that radically different 
selections of what is considered important are being
■'McClelland, D. C. 1961 The Achieving Society. Princeton, 
Van Nostrand.
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made from different environments by different 
people; so that a man bound to one culture might 
have great difficulty in understanding the choices of 
men bound to other cultures.
Of similar importance in fact distortion is the 
compelling quality on human thought and actions of 
the dominant beliefs and intellectual or emotional 
climate of a particular time. This applies with full 
force to social scientists. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, for example, to have been able to 
undertake social studies entirely uninfluenced by the 
evolutionary approach of Social Darwinism is diffi­
cult to imagine. In this century the British “social 
structure’’ school in social anthropology, and Talcott 
Parsons and his associates in sociology, have had an 
influence only somewhat less compelling.
To draw this argument together, then, what I am 
saying is that social facts are not as apparent nor as 
simple as they seem. Firstly, through blocks in our 
ability to experience, we do not perceive them as 
vividly as we might. Secondly, with special reference 
to human relations, even that which we do perceive is 
filtered through the elements of our accumulated 
experience. Thirdly, the cultural selectivity with 
which we operate tends to eliminate material to 
which we are not socially required to respond. And 
finally, in interpreting what we receive, we are con­
strained by the dominant cultural climate of our time, 
or w e  w i l l  n o t be lis te n e d  to.
So far we have only considered social facts and 
their perception. When, however, any attempt is 
made to relate them together, to generalize on their 
occurrence or to predict from them, a whole new set 
of problems arises. We are now at the second level 
of constructions and models. Here we are moving 
away from the often ill-conceived social facts to the 
interpretation of them. In common language we are 
considering the c o n s tru c t io n s  put upon the facts. Since
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these have social as well as individual implications 
this is the area which I will call S o c ia l  D is to r t io n .
It will be convenient at this juncture to take an 
example from the satirical work of an eminent anthro­
pologist, displaying a set of anthropological construc­
tions to perfection. Speaking of body ritual among the 
NACIRl: MA (spell this backwards for further in­
sight), Horace Miner has written:
“The fundamental belief underlying the whole 
system appears to be that the human body is ugly 
and that its natural tendency is to debility and 
disease. Incarcerated in such a body, man’s only 
hope is to avert these characteristics through the 
use of the powerful influences of ritual and cere­
mony . . .”
“The focal point of the shrine (for body ritual) is 
a box or chest which is built into the wall. In this 
chest are kept the many charms and magical potions 
without which no native believes he could live . . .”
“ Beneath the charm box is a small font. Each day 
every member of the family, in succession, enters the 
shrine room, bows his head before the charm box. 
mingles different sorts of holy water in the font, and 
proceeds with a brief rite of ablution. The holy 
waters arc secured from the Water Temple o f the 
community, where the priests conduct elaborate 
ceremonies to make the liquid ritually pure.”8
It is a terrible thing to dissect a good joke; but like 
all incisive parodies, this one has a powerful element 
of truth, and suitably illustrates my lecture so far. In 
the first place, notice how word-blocked Miner is in 
his imaginary role as the anthropologist from the out- 
culture. He has obviously had an overdose of the 
sociology of religion, and words like font, shrine, 
charm box and temple, which may or may not have 
meaning in the culture he is studying, interpose them-
6Miner, H. 1956 Body Ritual among the Nacirema. Arner. 
Anthro/x, 58, June, 503-507.
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selves between him and his direct experience of the 
social facts. Again, he has filtered out other available 
informacion, such as medical beliefs in the society 
about germs and body dirt. These may be highly 
relevant to the use of the bathroom for ablutions 
rather than for ritual or magical purposes. Further, it 
would seem that cultural selectivity has taken place 
in the sense that the value accent is predominantly 
upon the supernatural averting of evil rather than 
upon the pragmatic promotion of good which may be 
more characteristic of the culture. Finally, the un- 
mistakeable influence of the functional school of 
anthropology, deriving from Malinowski’s fieldwork, 
shows in every line of the text. For Miner this is part 
of the cultural climate of his time.
In terms of constructions, the anthropologist has 
taken a social fact-cluster which in American culture 
might be described as secular, and associated with the 
obsessive control of germs and body dirt. He has 
reconstructed this into a protective ritual to ward off 
debility and disease, which although perhaps not so 
wide ot the mark, is enough so for American and 
European participants to find it amusing.
The whole question is, could this intellectual 
parody be characteristic of a l l  scientific attempts to 
record. understand and analyse other cultures ? I think 
that to this we can only return a qualified answer. For 
the reasons given in the whole of this lecture so far, 
we can easily distort social facts even when we have 
lived in a culture for a long time and have done every­
thing possible to learn the language. Again, the con­
structions which we place on the facts as received can 
easily be selective and unconsciously imbued with 
our own culture, at least through the words which we 
use to describe them. Finally, when the social facts 
and constructions are assembled into models of the 
society concerned, further social distortion occurs 
which must now briefly be described.
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Here 1 only wish to summarize the material, as I 
have vvi itten elsewhere and at length on social 
models.'- 8 Briefly, the suggestion is that models are a 
constructed class or classes, with which the properties 
of corresponding classes of phenomena seen “in real 
life” are being compared by analogy. In plain laiv 
guage, as Sir Isaiah Berlin has put it: “To think is to 
generalize, to generalize is to compare. To think of 
one phenomenon or cluster of phenomena is to think 
in terms of its resemblances and differences with 
others. The other phenomena used as a reference 
in models, it seems to me, are necessarily phenomena 
from the society of origin of the investigator. The 
social structure model which has dominated socio- 
logy and anthropology over the last half-century is 
really a western intellectual conception: it has no 
place in the thought of the various peoples and tribes 
whose behaviour it has systematized for the benefit of 
western observers. Even variations of it, such as the 
social network model in which localized social rela­
tions art: represented by the strands of a net, are 
merely to help the outside observer visualize the 
situation. A member of the culture would never have 
planned or interpreted his relationships in such a way.
But more than this, as I have contended before,1" 
the models we mostly work with are id e a liz e d  models, 
stating the “correct” relationships which are con­
ceived by the investigator to exist between members 
of a given community, and filtering out the whole 
range of personal variations which actually go on be-
7Reader, D. H. 1964 Models in Social Change, with special 
reference to Southern Africa. Afr. Studies, 23, I, 11-33.
8Reader, D. H. 1969 Model and Metaphor in Social 
Anthropology. Zambe^ia (University College of Rhodesia), 1, 1,  
21-35.
"Berlin, I. 1962 Does Political Theory Still Hxist? In Phil­
osophy, Politics and Society (second series). Laslett, P. and 
Runciman.W. 0 .  eds. Oxford, Blackwell, p. 18.
‘"Reader, D. H. 1969 ihid., 23-24. 26.
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tween them. Moreover, through the presupposition 
of equilibrium which is necessary to systematic 
models of this kind, all inconsistencies and conflicts 
are masked, since they would lead to the destruction 
of the social system model being used. However, as 
long as the model works for explanatory or predictive 
purposes in  o u r  c u l tu r e , there seems little to be gained 
by probing its correspondence with an unknown 
social reality or in pointing out that it may make 
little sense to the peoples being studied.
Before we rationalize away social reality altogether 
at the model level, it may be said that the criteria of 
consistency and replicability suggest that most models 
have retained some reality contact, however tenuous. 
For example, I have fortunately been able to compare 
my own work among the Zulu11 with that of a Zulu 
social anthropologist12 working nearby in an area of 
continuous Zulu culture. While there is no doubt 
that we are both dealing with “the same” tribal cul- 
ture, our different cultural backgrounds and personal 
filters have meant that the theoretical approaches, the 
cultural selectivity and constructions are often differ­
ent in the two cases. The Zulu anthropologist, Dr. 
Vilakazi, has interpreted “from the inside” of the 
culture for western theorists; I have worked “from 
the outside” using western concepts for Zulu behav­
iour. It is difficult to say where more social distortion 
is to be found: in Vilakazi’s theory or my ethno­
graphy. Similar distortions have no doubt occurred 
in other ethnological instances, but are unreported; 
and the reason is mainly that each model is consistent 
enough for western purposes.
At this stage I would have liked to feel that we had 
adequately shown the distortions and uncertainties
“ Reader, D. H. 1966 Z u lu  T rib e in T ran sition . Manchester 
University Press.
12Vilakazi, A. 1962 Z u lu  T ransform ation s. Pietermaritzburg, 
University of Natal Press.
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of sociological investigation, and could perhaps pass 
on to some race relations. Indeed I wish that we 
could, but the most important area of social distor­
tion remains undisclosed and must now be dealt with 
briefly.
From the first level of social facts and the second 
level of constructions and models, I speak now at the 
third level of ideologies and rationalizations. These 
are devices with which men seek to bend even social 
reality as they know it so as to justify their often 
devious conduct to themselves and to others. The 
sociological approach towards this phenomenon I 
shall call s o c ia l  in s ig h t, a special part of the sociology 
of knowledge which studies hidden social meanings. 
The rationalizations which hide these meanings may 
be divided into the c o n tr iv e d , those which are know­
ingly entered into, and the u n c o n s c io u s  rationaliza­
tions. The latter, as Berger says, “very frequently . . . 
distort social reality in much the same way that an 
individual may neurotically deny, deform or reinter­
pret aspects of his life which are inconvenient to 
him.”13
At this point we may borrow from the social 
psychology of small groups to introduce one of the 
most important ideas that I have to put before you 
tonight: the concept of the Hidden Agenda. Most 
significant social decision-making at all levels nowa­
days is done in small groups or committees. For these 
there is usually an announced agenda, the subject 
matter for which the meeting is supposed to be called. 
However, quite a number of the committee members 
have not come to discuss this at all, or if they have, 
only superficially. Their real concern is with other 
and more personal interests. Some members have a 
conscious but c o n c e a le d  agenda, a contrived plan 
which they want the group to accept while pretending
13 Berger, op. cit., 54.
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to be working on the announced agenda. This 
corresponds to our contrived rationalization pre­
viously mentioned. Still others have a subconscious 
or h id d e n  agenda, which differs from the concealed 
agenda in not being directly accessible to the person 
who is maintaining it. The characteristic of a hidden 
agenda is that if somebody notices it and points it 
out, then everybody recognizes it, but nobody saw it 
before.
This brings us to a first consideration of the “social 
personality” model of society which I should like to 
propound. It seemed to me when working with this 
material a few years ago that many of the factors in 
individual distortion applied also to the distortion of 
ideas in society. In other words the interpretation of 
experience by social groups seemed liable to some­
what the same distortion or even pathology as was to 
be seen in the individual mind. Indeed one could go 
further and say that in the same way as with the 
human personality, sets of ideas held in society do 
not generally form a well-integrated system so much 
as loosely connected clusters which are often poorly 
formulated. Sometimes these clusters may be related 
in a hierarchy of importance or value. But far more 
often they seem compartmentalized or hidden from 
one another, so that there need be no consistency 
between one cluster and another.
In applying this “social personality” model of 
ideas in the present context of race relations, we are 
concerned, then, not only with poorly articulated 
ideas but with hidden agendas. Especially in this 
connection would one consider the local and national 
ideologies of a people living in a plural society. Since 
I shall be dealing with hidden agendas in more detail 
in the second half of this lecture, only one brief 
example is necessary now. In his famous study of
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race relations in the United States, Myrdal14 set forth 
the Negro problem as a dilemma. There was conflict, 
he said, between the American Creed, in which the 
American acts under the influence of high national 
and Christian precepts and, on the other hand, his 
various discriminatory evaluations of the rights and 
capacities of the Negro. In a sense this was an an­
nounced agenda, since the Creed is written into the 
American constitution. The h id d e n  agenda was some­
thing much more self-seeking. It was brought to light 
twenty years later in 1964 by Silberman, as follows:
“The tragedy of race relations in the United States 
is that there is no American dilemma. White Ameri­
cans are not torn and tortured by the conflict be­
tween their devotion to the American creed and their 
actual behaviour. They are upset by the current state 
of racial relations, to be sure. But what troubles 
them is not that justice is being denied but that their 
peace is being shattered and their business inter­
rupted.” 1"
So then, with this final addition to our conceptual 
tools of the Hidden Agenda, I hope that in a necessari­
ly hurried and undetailed way we have acquired the 
main apparatus needed to take a new look at race 
relations from a sociological viewpoint. Here I may 
say that the sociologist bold enough to investigate 
race relations at this level engages in what may be 
called g u n p o w d e r  s o c io lo g y : he presents his analysis 
and leaves hurriedly for another prearranged job 
before the whole affair blows up in his face. Perhaps 
that is one reason why the application of these tech­
niques, to which I am about to turn, has been 
relegated to the end of this lecture.
MMyrdal, G. 1944 An A m e ric a n  D ile m m a : T h e  N eg ro  
Problem  a n d  M o d e rn  D em ocracy. New York, Harper. 15
15Silberman, C. E. 1964 C risis  in B la c k  an d W h ite . New 
York, Random House.
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III
For this final sociological review of race relations, 
it will be convenient to do two things. First the mater­
ial will be approached from the theoretical position 
which has been outlined: social distortion and social 
insight. Secondly the relevant phenomena will be 
considered in the same order of social reality, social 
constructions and models, and social insight which 
has formed the structure of the whole lecture.
To begin with, the field covered by race relations is 
unsystematic and vast. About two years ago I made a 
content analysis of the subject catalogue of the South 
African Institute of Race Relations library in Johan­
nesburg: a well-known source library of race relations 
material. At that time some 2,670 books were cata­
logued under 1009 sub-titles. Seventy-six per cent of 
these sub-titles involved facts which were nearly or 
distantly related to race relations. A further fifteen 
per cent were associated with Political Science or 
Law, only two per cent with political comment 
(although this was heavily represented in the news 
section) and a mere seven per cent were concerned 
with scientific research. It is only the last category 
which concerns us here.
From my analysis at the first level of fact distortion, 
it would seem desirable that the so-called factual 
research in race relations should be carefully re­
appraised. Certainly we can do no better than begin 
with the concept of Race itself. Van den Berghe16 has 
fortunately distinguished the semantics of the situa­
tion for us with four different meanings of the term. 
First is physical race, involving the various forms 
of h o m o  s a p ie n s . Second is cultural race, used to des­
cribe a human group which shares certain cultural
16Van Den Berghe 1967 Race and Racism. New York, 
Wylie.
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characteristics such as language or religion (e.g. the 
“French race” or the “Jewish race”). Third is a relat­
ively unimportant meaning loosely used as a synonym 
for species (e.g. the “human race”). Lastly is a sense 
in which I quote van den Berghe in full: “a human 
group that defines itself and/or is defined by other 
groups as different from other groups by virtue of 
innate and immutable physical characteristics. These 
physical characteristics are in turn believed to be 
intrinsically related to moral, intellectual and other 
non-physical attributes or abilities.” (p.9). In other 
words, he refers to a group which is socially different­
iated on the basis of physical criteria. From this I 
imagine that we could define race relations as those 
obtaining between people who attribute different 
racial characteristics to one another.
It was evidently with this last sense in mind that 
twenty-two world famous biologists, geneticists and 
anthropologists from seventeen countries met under 
UNESCO in August 1964 and issued an agreed state­
ment on the human b io lo g ic a l aspects of race.17 I can­
not quote all the articles of this statement, but their 
import is clear. In a section on biological inferiority, 
for example, the experts stated that certain physical 
characteristics have general survival value irrespective 
of the environment. The differences ascribed to race 
do not affect these characteristics, and hence no race 
can be said to be biologically inferior or superior to 
any other.
In regard to comparative intelligence, it was said 
that no convincing difference has ever been demon­
strated by tests between the hereditary intellectual 
endowments of different human groups. On the 
other hand ample evidence supports the influence of 
physical, cultural and social environments on differ­
ences in response to intelligence tests.
17Unesco 1964 Proposals on the B iological A sp e cts o f  Race. 
Moscow, Unesco publication.
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Again, in the matter o f  interracial marriage, the 
scientists proposed that the biological consequences 
of a marriage depend only on the genetic make-up 
of the couple, and not on their race. No biological 
justification therefore exists, they said, for prohibit­
ing intermarriage between persons of different races, 
or for advising against it on racial grounds.
Well, these are certainly impressive scientific 
statements about the b io lo g y  of race. One might 
wonder at several points whether they represent 
positive findings or rather the negative conclusion of 
differences not proven. It might further be argued 
that since it is impossible to hold all the variables con­
stant, the proof of significant difference in many of 
the comparisons is weaker than in most other major 
scientific areas. No doubt, however, the statements 
are as biologically accurate as the knowledge of our 
time allows.
The fact remains that these statements taken to­
gether contain a profound hidden agenda, such as the 
array of scientists assembled might have led one to 
expect. While ostensibly stating only the biology of 
race, they are in reality aiming to influence the socio­
logy of race which in various parts of the world 
depends on totally different premises.
Speaking as a sociologist, I must say that I think 
this hidden agenda is foredoomed to failure, at least 
in the immediate future. For those whose biological 
and social views on race coincide, the statement 
provides a heartwarming scientific confirmation of 
what they already believe. But these are the converted 
to whom the UNESCO statement is preaching. They 
subscribe to what I call the Brotherhood of Man 
model of the world. There are many other people 
today, however, who are upholders of the “Baboon” 
theory—they think that the black man is of a lower 
order and that he will be a long time in developing. 
Some of these people could perhaps accept certain of
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the UNESCO articles, but many of them would 
probably reject the findings as a whole.
Now, as Biesheuvel said some years ago, if science 
tells the man in the street that something is the case 
which his own common sense denies, then this only 
makes him suspicious of science.18 The social reality 
by which men judge racial situations, especially those 
in which they are in a racial minority, is not compos­
ed primarily of biological facts but of social ones. 
And these are subject in the process of perception to 
all the social distortion which I have tried to bring out 
in this lecture. To confront the “Baboon” theorists 
with factual intellectual statements about biology 
only stiffens their resistance in the knowledge that 
what really counts for them is the social and emotion­
al situation.
From biological facts let us turn to psychological 
facts and test the sociology of these. During the 
period from 1930 to 1950, American social psycho­
logy was to a large extent concerned with the measure­
ment of attitudes. As applied to race relations, the 
concealed agenda behind this work was that racial 
behaviour was assumed to be an outward expression 
of these attitudes, and that if the attitudes could be 
changed then the behaviour would automatically 
change too.
Far too much of this research has subsequently 
become of little practical effect for the simple reason 
that further work has largely denied the concealed 
premise. It no longer appears that attitudes or stereo­
types as revealed by an informant are necessarily an 
indicator of his overt behaviour. From the present 
analysis I shall not again have to labour the social 
distortion to be expected: a man’s inability to know 
how he feels, his unwillingness to communicate what
18 Neither Dr. Biesheuvel nor I can any longer find this 
quotation among his numerous publications; but he does 
remember that he said it (personal communication).
SOCIAL DISTORTION 21
he knows, and so on. Here, however, there is a new 
distortion which we have not previously considered 
—the b e h a v io u r a l distortion which presses upon a man 
because of the social circumstances in which he has to 
act. As Herbert Blumer in an excellent review19 20has 
put it: “One has only to think of the extent to which, 
in everyday life, a normal person is required to check 
and restrain his dispositions, to compromise his 
feelings, and to force himself to undertake courses of 
action for which he has no liking. Attitudes enter 
into behaviour but do not account for the behaviour. 
What is needed is an understanding of how the 
attitude is handled by the person . . .  as he takes 
account of the situation in which he is acting.” 
(pp. 434-435).
Somewhat the same point has been made by Banton 
when he suggests that interracial behaviour may be 
determined by the roles the parties are playing rather 
than by their sentiments as individuals.-" If taken to 
its limit, this kind of analysis can lead to some dis­
turbing conclusions. It might be held that most 
people, most of the time, do not have strong feelings 
or convictions of their own about racial situations at 
all. In whatever manner they react to racial attitude 
questionnaires and rationalize convincing but distort­
ed replies to satisfy the investigator, what they are 
really doing in practice is running with the herd. In 
fact they are conforming to the role-dictates of the 
State, the party, the neighbourhood, or any other 
ego-supportive group they have; simply because to 
conform is reinforcing and rewarding, whereas not 
to conform involves withdrawal of support and even 
social penalties.
19Blumer, H. 1958 Research on Race Relations: United 
States of America. Int. Soc. Sci. Bull. X, 3, 403-447.
20Banton, M. 1965 Race Relations, London, Social Science 
Paperbacks, 326, 331.
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Such a position, extreme as it is, tends to harmon­
ize well with some of the more significant items of 
policy knowledge said to have emerged from race 
relations research in the United States:'-1
1. A knowledge of the r a c ia l  fe e l in g s  held by 
people is no safe guarantee of how they will 
act in racial situations.
2. The s o c ia l  d e m a n d s  of a situation, particular­
ly when supported by accepted authority 
figures, are effective determinants of individ­
ual action in race relations.
3. The most effective way of changing the 
racial feelings of individuals is to change the 
r a c i a l  p o lic ie s  of the groups with which such 
individuals identify themselves.
4. The mobilization of p o w e r  g ro u p s  on behalf 
of a programme of racial change is more 
effective than a campaign of moral exhorta­
tion, a process of education, or even a 
programme of legislation.
From the material just examined it would seem 
that a more comprehensive approach than racial 
attitudes alone would be on the c o n s tru c t io n s  which 
people put on race relations situations, and the 
contexts in which they use these constructions. From 
the beginning there would have to be a realization 
that much of the material would be irrational and 
distorted. A full acceptance would be needed too 
that especially in modern impersonal society the 
constructions placed upon human actions are tre­
mendously important in supporting or rejecting 
individuals in their social roles. The fortunate and 
efficient persons who are socially confirmed in their 
roles also tend to be self-supporting in them: in fact
1 Rlumer, H. ibid., 432-433.
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they b e co m e the roles with which they are endowed, 
especially in cases of leadership. The intense inter­
nalization of role which is thus possible is superbly 
illustrated in the second book of Milton’s “Paradise 
Lost”. Here the tremendous figure of Beelzebub 
enters the debate in Hell, like some aged Chatham or 
Gladstone, who:
“ in his rising seemed
A pillar of state. Deep on his front engraven 
Deliberation sat and public care;
And princely counsel in his face yet shone,
Majestic though in ruin.”
So much for the rewards of high office, of a secure 
elite or dominant community. But what of the discre­
dited leader, the man who cannot fulfil his role-claims, 
or worse the community which is socially deprived 
through denial of political power and representation? 
Sometimes these people may also assume the social 
characteristics with which they are invested: seen 
socially as inferior, they may become socially inferior. 
At other times, however, they may plot for freedom, 
while practising the techniques of withholding of 
confirmation of the existing order, so ably outlined 
by Berger.22
Perhaps, at an extreme again, we may have to face 
the pessimistic conclusions of the existentialist psy­
chiatrist, Ronald Laing. In a forthcoming book 
called T h e  P o lit ic s  o f  th e  F a m ily  he claims that under the 
banner of mutual loyalty and concern, men become 
non-thinking tools of the group. All those who be­
long to it are considered We, and merit its protection 
and privileges. Those who stand outside the group
are labelled Them-..the Reds, the Whites, the Blacks.
He calls this We-Them mysticism the ethic of the 
Gadarene swine, and its credo is to remain true, one
--Rereer, P. L. op c i t 130-156.
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for all and all for one, as the in-group members 
plunge in brotherhood to their destruction.
To come back to Central Africa (if indeed we ever 
left it) we need to know here in Rhodesia what are the 
constructions or interpretations which are being 
placed upon one another by members of various 
racial groups in significant race relations contexts. 
It has seemed to us for purposes of the Round Table 
race relations research, that one of the most signifi­
cant of these contexts is the economic one. Against a 
background of the actual employment potential for 
Africans in Rhodesia, we shall be investigating on the 
one hand the employer’s conception of the African 
part in the total economy. From the other point of 
view we shall be interested in how Africans in the 
process of education conceive their roles and func­
tions in the Rhodesian economy of the future. It is 
generally a s s u m e d  that white employers place certain 
constructions on employing skilled Africans in 
Rhodesia, but these constructions and the contexts in 
which they apply have never been scientifically 
tested. Again it may be a s s u m e d  that educated 
Africans have certain aspirations for their future in 
this country, but such assumptions have never been 
checked against the responses of the Africans them­
selves. In accordance with the argument in this lec­
ture, we shall also be considering the social facts of 
cultural deprivation and their behavioural effects on 
Africans in the economy. Finally there will be the 
socio-linguistic problem of distortions of dialogue 
between the different races engaged in economic 
activity.
At this point we turn to models in race relations, 
on which I believe that I can be mercifully brief. The 
models in use so far have, of course, been importa­
tions from various social sciences working in this 
field: sociology, social anthropology and political 
science. A popular one recently, which was cited by
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Professor Mitchell in his inaugural lecture,23 is the 
plural society model. Its principal value seems to be 
to draw attention to what I would call the disjunctive 
cultural coexistence, or existence with minimal dia- 
logue, of people of different races in the same society.
What is wanted now in race relations research 
seems to be a new model which is problem-oriented 
in other directions and would promote further hypo­
theses. Speaking only from the “social distortion” 
viewpoint which I have been advocating, I would 
again suggest that a s o c ia l  p e r s o n a l i ty  model of society, 
derived from social psychology, would be helpful at 
this stage. The model would postulate that all socie­
ties are like the average human personality, having 
the following characteristics:
1. receiving only a selective intake of social 
data which are distorted in the process of 
assimilation;
2. only partially able to synthesize that which 
is received, so that full realization of a social 
situation is seldom if ever achieved;
3. resorting for purposes of self-protection and 
avoidance of distress to massive compart- 
mentalization of incompatible clusters of 
interests and ideas;
4. displaying as a result a set of mutually con­
flicting interests and needs, perhaps hier­
archically arranged if the society is well 
integrated, but more likely not;
5. turning for solution to at least some of the 
defence mechanisms in the human mind 
known to psychotherapists: repression, with­
drawal, denial, displacement, projection 
and above all rationalization;
23MitchelI. J. C. 1960 Tribalism and the Plural Society. 
Inaugural lecture. University College of Rhodesia.
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6. hiding from social scrutiny a series of con- 
cealed or hidden agendas for social action 
in concord with the defence mechanisms 
in 5;
7. presenting under certain circumstances a 
social pathology of neurosis or even psycho­
sis which, as in the human mind, can some­
times spontaneously remit.
All this is going further than some might agree to 
on a conflict model, and especially on a psychological 
model of society. Nor can I claim that at this stage I 
have at all adequately tested the model against world­
wide race relations data. For the moment 1 can only 
conclude by citing a few instances in which the de­
fence mechanisms postulated in the model may assist 
in the s o c ia l  in s ig h t area of race relations.
The matter of irrationality and compartmentaliza- 
tion in racial thought and behaviour can be seen over 
and over again in human society. In Southern Africa, 
for example, black people are sometimes said to be 
lazy, which is one of the reasons why they may be 
despised; yet at the same time stringent precautions 
have to be taken to prevent them from taking white 
men’s jobs. Similarly in the 1950s in Britain, the 
norms thought appropriate for public relations with 
coloured people differed strikingly from the private 
opinions of a British sample, expressing their more 
personal sentiments.-'1 Even in Brazil, recent work has 
demonstrated that a public ideology of racial equality 
can coexist with a private practice of discrimination. 
In each of these cases, society is so arranged that the 
contradictory propositions never confront one an­
other.
The closely allied mechanisms of withdrawal and 
denial are well displayed in Banton’s summary analy- 24
24 Banton, M. ibid., 376, 379.
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sis of British reserve towards coloured people and 
other foreigners.25 The av oidance of coloured people 
is represented as involving fears that as strangers they 
might not know the expectations of conduct. Above 
all, they would not know how to read British signals 
of unacceptable behaviour, conveyed and received by 
tacit understanding. Here I really must give the state­
ment of a Nigerian nurse in Britain, as quoted by 
Banton:
“English people are most difficult to deal with 
even though at most times they appear quite charm­
ing. They say “yes” when they don’t mean “yes” . 
They are very polite, and this may mean that there 
are fewer quarrels, but sometimes in life it is a good 
thing to speak directly. However, since English 
people speak the same way to each other, 1 don’t 
think you can accuse them of hypocrisy: evidently 
they understand each other.”20
For the next social mechanism, displacement, there 
is probably no better example than Dollard’s C a s te  
a n d  C la s s  in a  S o u th e rn  Town, written in 1937. This 
sociologist paid special attention from a Freudian 
standpoint to the irrational elements of social behav­
iour. He at first overstated his case for irrationality in 
race conflict situations, but in a later journal article27 
produced a useful distinction between irrational 
antagonism and intelligible hostility in race prejudice. 
In conditions of intelligible hostility such as the 
competitive employment situation, the whites show­
ed direct aggression to rival Negro workers. Where 
the frustrating agency derived from the white group 
itself, however, the white individual did not attack
23 Banton, M. ibid., 379.
26 Banton, M. ibid., 380.
27DolIard, J. 1938 Hostility and Fear in Social Life. Social 
Forces, 17, 15-26.
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directly but displaced his aggression upon some 
scapegoat.
This phenomenon of displacement is closely con­
nected with projection, which is best seen in racial 
stereotyping. Social races certainly do exhibit genuine 
differences: in religion, dress, family organisation, 
and other characteristics which reflect historical, 
environmental and cultural influences. But it is rarely 
these which are chosen as characteristics for stereo­
typing. As the psychologist Peter Watson has recently 
pointed out,28 the stereotypes chosen sometimes 
betray anxieties over personal matters among the 
stereotypers themselves: over ability, sex, and various 
other desires in which to some extent all of us share. 
Because these anxieties are unbearable they have to 
be projected onto somebody who cannot retaliate: 
preferably people in another group or race. Alterna­
tively, the characteristics chosen for stereotyping 
show the extent to which the users fall short of their 
own ideals—in society, in the home, at work and so 
on. Thus a Jewish group can be stereotyped as mer­
cenary, industrious and ambitious. From all this, 
Watson suggests that we must try and understand 
why and under what circumstances inaccurate and 
irrational opinions about racial differences need to 
be created and exaggerated within certain individuals.
Finally among the defence mechanisms, I have 
already spoken on ideologies and rationalizations, 
both contrived and unconscious. The concept of 
rationalization is important for present purposes as 
the justification for all hidden agendas, many of 
which are created for use with the defence mechan­
isms just outlined. When beliefs are compartmental­
ized, it seems that they occur in pairs: the hidden 
agenda and the rationalization which makes it tenable.
28Watson, P. 1968 The Myth of Racial Incompatibility. 
Illustrated London News, September 28, p. 22.
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A possible hidden agenda could be the desire to 
defend one’s job against coloured competition. Since 
this demeans one’s own economic status, it needs a 
rationalization—and thus we have the stereotype that 
coloured people are lazy. In cases of British with­
drawal, or reserve towards foreigners, the hidden 
agenda is that the resident stranger may be unpredict­
able, or uncontrollable. The rationalization is the 
brotherhood of man model and the polite fiction that 
the stranger is acceptable—in short, denial of with­
drawal. For displacement, the hidden agenda may be 
that one is hostile to one’s own group because it does 
not support one’s interests; the rationalization is that 
one behaves aggressively towards a helpless scape­
goat. And lastly in projection, the hidden agenda is 
that one feels inferior; the rationalization is that the 
out-group is inferior.
From all this you may well infer that in terms of 
social perception we are still in the Middle Ages. If 
so many interpretations are possible, you may say, 
and so many kinds of social distortion, how can we 
ever arrive ar social reality, or advance in understand­
ing, or for that matter correct our own perceptual 
faults? In response to this, I think that we have to 
make certain assumptions or utter certain articles of 
belief. If asked to define social reality, I should tend 
to reply in terms of the convergence of a sufficient 
number of human perspectives on a given social 
situation. And by “sufficient” I should mean that if 
there were too few, the agreed consensus on “what 
was happening” would be patchy and incomplete; if 
too many, the surplus perspectives would add little 
to what was already known to have happened. If this 
view of social reality is true, it follows that there is a 
consensus reality, perhaps shifting, towards which we 
can all strive; and it may be inferred that as we 
advance in evolutionary progress and are more and
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more exposed to that reality, it should be more 
approximated towards and better understood.
Perhaps many of you who work in the held of 
human behaviour may wish to apply the concept of 
social distortion to your own specialty. Obviously, 
administrators have good reason to consider the 
notion of the hidden agenda. Historians may wonder 
about the validity of historical reconstructions which 
come to them through so many filters from the past. 
The critics of literature could well philosophize on 
their own conflicts over an author’s intentions and 
symbolism. Even the theologians may ponder on 
distortions of the divine which are man-made rather 
than God-given. As for the politicians, the noble art 
of persuasion runs the whole gamut of social distor­
tion.
Finally, I should not wish the concept of Social 
Distortion to be taken at too much of an extreme. 
Perhaps through a sheer desire to show the other side 
of what is usually presented, I have over-emphasized 
the inaccuracy of social facts, the arbitrary quality of 
social constructions, the idealized nature of social 
models and the irrationality of social defences in race 
relations. So be it. Certainly I would affirm, after 
Berger’s paraphrase of Thomas the American socio­
logist, that “society can exist by virtue of the fact 
that most of the time most people’s definitions of the 
most important situations at least coincide approx­
imately.’’29 But that is as far as it seems advisable to 
go. In race relations, whatever we think of the situa­
tion at present, it is to be hoped that mankind will 
one day reach the goal of brotherhood. An obstacle 
in the path would seem to be the vast and mutual 
antagonisms generated by racial misperception. For 
social scientists who want to help in race relations, 
the search for truth might first lie in the field of 
social distortion.
2SRerger, P. L. op. cit., 111.
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